Pascal Reisert

Abstract

In recent years, actively secure SPDZ-like protocols for dishonest majority, like SPDZ2k, Overdrive2k, and MHz2k, over base rings Z2k have become more and more efficient. In this paper, we present a new actively secure MPC protocol Multipars that outperforms these state-of-the-art protocols over Z2k by more than a factor of 2 in the two-party setup in terms of communication. Multipars is the first actively secure N-party protocol over Z2k that is based on linear homomorphic encryption (LHE) in the offline phase (instead of oblivious transfer or somewhat homomorphic encryption in previous works). The strong performance of Multipars relies on a new adaptive packing for BGV ciphertexts that allows us to reduce the parameter size of the encryption scheme and the overall communication cost. Additionally, we use modulus switching for further size reduction, a new type of enhanced CPA security over Z2k, a truncation protocol for Beaver triples, and a new LHE-based offline protocol without sacrificing over Z2k. We have implemented Multipars and therewith provide the fastest preprocessing phase over Z2k. Our evaluation shows that Multipars offers at least a factor of 8 lower communication costs and up to a factor of 10.2 faster runtime in the WAN setting compared to the currently best available MPC implementation over Z2k.

Abstract

Replay attacks are among the most well-known attacks against vote privacy. Many e-voting systems have been proven vulnerable to replay attacks, including systems like Helios that are used in real practical elections. Despite their popularity, it is commonly believed that replay attacks are inefficient but the actual threat that they pose to vote privacy has never been studied formally. Therefore, in this paper, we precisely analyze for the first time how efficient replay attacks really are. We study this question from commonly used and complementary perspectives on vote privacy, showing as an independent contribution that a simple extension of a popular game-based privacy definition corresponds to a strong entropy-based notion. Our results demonstrate that replay attacks can be devastating for a voter's privacy even when an adversary's resources are very limited. We illustrate our formal findings by applying them to a number of real-world elections, showing that a modest number of replays can result in significant privacy loss. Overall, our work reveals that, contrary to a common belief, replay attacks can be very efficient and must therefore be considered a serious threat.

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) has seen a strong rise in popularity in recent years and has become an essential tool for research and industrial applications. Given the large amount of high quality data needed and the often sensitive nature of ML data, privacy-preserving collaborative ML is of increasing importance. In this paper, we introduce new actively secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols which are specially optimized for privacy-preserving machine learning applications. We concentrate on the optimization of (tensor) convolutions which belong to the most commonly used components in ML architectures, especially in convolutional neural networks but also in recurrent neural networks or transformers, and therefore have a major impact on the overall performance. Our approach is based on a generalized form of structured randomness that speeds up convolutions in a fast online phase. The structured randomness is generated with homomorphic encryption using adapted and newly constructed packing methods for convolutions, which might be of independent interest. Overall our protocols extend the state-of-the-art Overdrive family of protocols (Keller et al., EUROCRYPT 2018). We implemented our protocols on-top of MP-SPDZ (Keller, CCS 2020) resulting in a full-featured implementation with support for faster convolutions. Our evaluation shows that our protocols outperform state-of-the-art actively secure MPC protocols on ML tasks like evaluating ResNet50 by a factor of 3 or more. Benchmarks for depthwise convolutions show order-of-magnitude speed-ups compared to existing approaches.

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) has seen a strong rise in popularity in recent years and has become an essential tool for research and industrial applications. Given the large amount of high quality data needed and the often sensitive nature of ML data, privacy-preserving collaborative ML is of increasing importance. In this paper, we introduce new actively secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols which are specially optimized for privacy-preserving machine learning applications. We concentrate on the optimization of (tensor) convolutions which belong to the most commonly used components in ML architectures, especially in convolutional neural networks but also in recurrent neural networks or transformers, and therefore have a major impact on the overall performance. Our approach is based on a generalized form of structured randomness that speeds up convolutions in a fast online phase. The structured randomness is generated with homomorphic encryption using adapted and newly constructed packing methods for convolutions, which might be of independent interest. Overall our protocols extend the state-of-the-art Overdrive family of protocols (Keller et al., EUROCRYPT 2018). We implemented our protocols on-top of MP-SPDZ (Keller, CCS 2020) resulting in a full-featured implementation with support for faster convolutions. Our evaluation shows that our protocols outperform state-of-the-art actively secure MPC protocols on ML tasks like evaluating ResNet50 by a factor of 3 or more. Benchmarks for depthwise convolutions show order-of-magnitude speed-ups compared to existing approaches.

Abstract

Some of the most efficient protocols for Multi-Party Computation (MPC) follow a two-phase approach where correlated randomness, in particular Beaver triples, is generated in the offline phase and then used to speed up the online phase. Recently, more complex correlations have been introduced to optimize certain operations even further, such as matrix triples for matrix multiplications. In this paper, our goal is to improve the efficiency of the triple generation in general and in particular for classical field values as well as matrix operations. To this end, we modify the Overdrive LowGear protocol to remove the costly sacrificing step and therewith reduce the round complexity and the bandwidth. We extend the state-of- the-art MP-SPDZ implementation with our new protocols and show that the new offline phase outperforms state-of-the-art protocols for the generation of Beaver triples and matrix triples. For example, we save 33 % in bandwidth compared to Overdrive LowGear.

Abstract

Some of the most efficient protocols for Multi-Party Computation (MPC) follow a two-phase approach where correlated randomness, in particular Beaver triples, is generated in the offline phase and then used to speed up the online phase. Recently, more complex correlations have been introduced to optimize certain operations even further, such as matrix triples for matrix multiplications. In this paper, our goal is to improve the efficiency of the triple generation in general and in particular for classical field values as well as matrix operations. To this end, we modify the Overdrive LowGear protocol to remove the costly sacrificing step and therewith reduce the round complexity and the bandwidth. We extend the state-of- the-art MP-SPDZ implementation with our new protocols and show that the new offline phase outperforms state-of-the-art protocols for the generation of Beaver triples and matrix triples. For example, we save 33 % in bandwidth compared to Overdrive LowGear.

Abstract

Gaze estimation methods have significantly matured in recent years but the large number of eye images required to train deep learning models poses significant privacy risks. In addition, the heterogeneous data distribution across different users can significantly hinder the training process. In this work, we propose the first federated learning approach for gaze estimation to preserve the privacy of gaze data. We further employ pseudo-gradients optimisation to adapt our federated learning approach to the divergent model updates to address the heterogeneous nature of in-the-wild gaze data in collaborative setups. We evaluate our approach on a real-world dataset (MPIIGaze dataset) and show that our work enhances the privacy guarantees of conventional appearance-based gaze estimation methods, handles the convergence issues of gaze estimators, and significantly outperforms vanilla federated learning by 15.8 % (from a mean error of 10.83 degrees to 8.95 degrees). As such, our work paves the way to develop privacy-aware collaborative learning setups for gaze estimation while maintaining the model's performance.

Abstract

Gaze estimation methods have significantly matured in recent years but the large number of eye images required to train deep learning models poses significant privacy risks. In addition, the heterogeneous data distribution across different users can significantly hinder the training process. In this work, we propose the first federated learning approach for gaze estimation to preserve the privacy of gaze data. We further employ pseudo-gradients optimisation to adapt our federated learning approach to the divergent model updates to address the heterogeneous nature of in-the-wild gaze data in collaborative setups. We evaluate our approach on a real-world dataset (MPIIGaze dataset) and show that our work enhances the privacy guarantees of conventional appearance-based gaze estimation methods, handles the convergence issues of gaze estimators, and significantly outperforms vanilla federated learning by 15.8 % (from a mean error of 10.83 degrees to 8.95 degrees). As such, our work paves the way to develop privacy-aware collaborative learning setups for gaze estimation while maintaining the model's performance.

Abstract

Elections are an important corner stone of democratic processes. In addition to publishing the final result (e.g., the overall winner), elections typically publish the full tally consisting of all (aggregated) individual votes. This causes several issues, including loss of privacy for both voters and election candidates as well as so-called Italian attacks that allow for easily coercing voters. Several e-voting systems have been proposed to address these issues by hiding (parts of) the tally. This property is called tally-hiding. Existing tally-hiding e-voting systems in the literature aim at hiding (part of) the tally from everyone, including voting authorities, while at the same time offering verifiability, an important and standard feature of modern e-voting systems which allows voters and external observers to check that the published election result indeed corresponds to how voters actually voted. In contrast, real elections often follow a different common practice for hiding the tally: the voting authorities internally compute (and learn) the full tally but publish only the final result (e.g., the winner). This practice, which we coin publicly tally-hiding, indeed solves the aforementioned issues for the public, but currently has to sacrifice verifiability due to a lack of practical systems. In this paper, we close this gap. We formalize the common notion of publicly tally-hiding and propose the first provably secure verifiable e-voting system, called Kryvos, which directly targets publicly tally-hiding elections. We instantiate our system for a wide range of both simple and complex voting methods and various result functions. We provide an extensive evaluation which shows that Kryvos is practical and able to handle a large number of candidates, complex voting methods and result functions. Altogether, Kryvos shows that the concept of publicly tally-hiding offers a new trade-off between privacy and efficiency that is different from all previous tally-hiding systems and which allows for a radically new protocol design resulting in a practical e-voting system.

Abstract

Elections are an important corner stone of democratic processes. In addition to publishing the final result (e.g., the overall winner), elections typically publish the full tally consisting of all (aggregated) individual votes. This causes several issues, including loss of privacy for both voters and election candidates as well as so-called Italian attacks that allow for easily coercing voters. Several e-voting systems have been proposed to address these issues by hiding (parts of) the tally. This property is called tally-hiding. Existing tally-hiding e-voting systems in the literature aim at hiding (part of) the tally from everyone, including voting authorities, while at the same time offering verifiability, an important and standard feature of modern e-voting systems which allows voters and external observers to check that the published election result indeed corresponds to how voters actually voted. In contrast, real elections often follow a different common practice for hiding the tally: the voting authorities internally compute (and learn) the full tally but publish only the final result (e.g., the winner). This practice, which we coin publicly tally-hiding, indeed solves the aforementioned issues for the public, but currently has to sacrifice verifiability due to a lack of practical systems. In this paper, we close this gap. We formalize the common notion of publicly tally-hiding and propose the first provably secure verifiable e-voting system, called Kryvos, which directly targets publicly tally-hiding elections. We instantiate our system for a wide range of both simple and complex voting methods and various result functions. We provide an extensive evaluation which shows that Kryvos is practical and able to handle a large number of candidates, complex voting methods and result functions. Altogether, Kryvos shows that the concept of publicly tally-hiding offers a new trade-off between privacy and efficiency that is different from all previous tally-hiding systems and which allows for a radically new protocol design resulting in a practical e-voting system.

Abstract

Replay attacks are among the most well-known attacks against vote privacy. Many e-voting systems have been proven vulnerable to replay attacks, including systems like Helios that are used in real practical elections. Despite their popularity, it is commonly believed that replay attacks are inefficient but the actual threat that they pose to vote privacy has never been studied formally. Therefore, in this paper, we precisely analyze for the first time how efficient replay attacks really are. We study this question from commonly used and complementary perspectives on vote privacy, showing as an independent contribution that a simple extension of a popular game-based privacy definition corresponds to a strong entropy-based notion. Our results demonstrate that replay attacks can be devastating for a voter’s privacy even when an adversary’s resources are very limited. We illustrate our formal findings by applying them to a number of real-world elections, showing that a modest number of replays can result in significant privacy loss. Overall, our work reveals that, contrary to a common belief, replay attacks can be very efficient and must therefore be considered a serious threat.

Abstract

Replay attacks are among the most well-known attacks against vote privacy. Many e-voting systems have been proven vulnerable to replay attacks, including systems like Helios that are used in real practical elections. Despite their popularity, it is commonly believed that replay attacks are inefficient but the actual threat that they pose to vote privacy has never been studied formally. Therefore, in this paper, we precisely analyze for the first time how efficient replay attacks really are. We study this question from commonly used and complementary perspectives on vote privacy, showing as an independent contribution that a simple extension of a popular game-based privacy definition corresponds to a strong entropy-based notion. Our results demonstrate that replay attacks can be devastating for a voter’s privacy even when an adversary’s resources are very limited. We illustrate our formal findings by applying them to a number of real-world elections, showing that a modest number of replays can result in significant privacy loss. Overall, our work reveals that, contrary to a common belief, replay attacks can be very efficient and must therefore be considered a serious threat.

Abstract

Some of the most efficient protocols for Multi-Party Computation (MPC) use a two-phase approach where correlated randomness, in particular Beaver triples, is generated in the offline phase and then used to speed up the online phase. Recently, more complex correlations have been introduced to optimize certain operations even further, such as matrix triples for matrix multiplications. In this paper, our goal is to speed up the evaluation of multivariate polynomials and therewith of whole arithmetic circuits in the online phase. To this end, we introduce a new form of correlated randomness: arithmetic tuples. Arithmetic tuples can be fine tuned in various ways to the constraints of application at hand, in terms of round complexity, bandwidth, and tuple size. We show that for many real-world setups an arithmetic tuples based online phase outperforms state-of-the-art protocols based on Beaver triples.

Abstract

In recent years, lattice-based secure multi-party computation (MPC) has seen a rise in popularity and is used more and more in large scale applications like privacy-preserving cloud computing, electronic voting, or auctions. Many of these applications come with the following high security requirements: a computation result should be publicly verifiable, with everyone being able to identify a malicious party and hold it accountable, and a malicious party should not be able to corrupt the computation, force a protocol restart, or block honest parties or an honest third-party (client) that provided private inputs from receiving a correct result. The protocol should guarantee verifiability and accountability even if all protocol parties are malicious. While some protocols address one or two of these often essential security features, we present the first publicly verifiable and accountable, and (up to a threshold) robust SPDZ-like MPC protocol without restart. We propose protocols for accountable and robust online, offline, and setup computations. We adapt and partly extend the lattice-based commitment scheme by Baum et al. (SCN 2018) as well as other primitives like ZKPs. For the underlying commitment scheme and the underlying BGV encryption scheme we determine ideal parameters. We give a performance evaluation of our protocols and compare them to state-of-the-art protocols both with and without our target security features: public accountability, public verifiability and robustness.

Abstract

In recent years, lattice-based secure multi-party computation (MPC) has seen a rise in popularity and is used more and more in large scale applications like privacy-preserving cloud computing, electronic voting, or auctions. Many of these applications come with the following high security requirements: a computation result should be publicly verifiable, with everyone being able to identify a malicious party and hold it accountable, and a malicious party should not be able to corrupt the computation, force a protocol restart, or block honest parties or an honest third-party (client) that provided private inputs from receiving a correct result. The protocol should guarantee verifiability and accountability even if all protocol parties are malicious. While some protocols address one or two of these often essential security features, we present the first publicly verifiable and accountable, and (up to a threshold) robust SPDZ-like MPC protocol without restart. We propose protocols for accountable and robust online, offline, and setup computations. We adapt and partly extend the lattice-based commitment scheme by Baum et al. (SCN 2018) as well as other primitives like ZKPs. For the underlying commitment scheme and the underlying BGV encryption scheme we determine ideal parameters. We give a performance evaluation of our protocols and compare them to state-of-the-art protocols both with and without our target security features: public accountability, public verifiability and robustness.